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FORUM 
Joseph G. Ferrante 
In 1986, when Frank Lorenzo took over Eastern Airlines, the country's third largest carrier was in decline: its route 
structure was inherently weak, its costs were sky high, and its stiff-necked labor unions fought with each other almost 
as much as they fought management. To rnzmy in corporate America, Lorenzo seemed just the man to whip Eastern back 
into shape. Lorenzo, with the help of Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert 's junk bond machine, built his tiny 
Texas Air Corporation into an empire. Indeed, with the addition of Eastern to Continental, Frontier, and People Express 
airlmes, Lorenzo controlled the largest airline in the country, nylng more than a fifth of the nation's air passengers on 
his planes. Larenzo has been characterized as a ruthless empire builder, who uses a seemingly simple formula of slashing 
costs and offering lower fares. The problem, however, is that he had failed to parlay his formula into profitability. New 
York Air failed; Continental was consistently losing money; and Eastern was on the brink of extinction (Gessell, 167). 
Moreover, Lorenzo represented the get-tough approach to 
management that Ronald Reagan had revived when the 
President fired striking air traflic controllers in 198 1. While 
some U.S. companies had started to experiment with the 
Japanese-inspired labor-management cooperation techniques 
as a way of restoring America to global competitiveness, 
Lorenzo went in the opposite direction (Bernstein, 7). In 
1983, his uncompromising style had brought about an 
apparently miraculous turnaround at Continental and set him 
up as a shining example of a business leader willing to fight 
labor to create a lean and successfd company. Wall Street 
celebrated the renewal of a dying breed of tough managers 
@ernstein, 8). 
But, like k e l  Brrmham and the jd -bond  takeover binge 
of the 1980s, Lorenzo's effort blew up in his face. Although 
his brilliant financial manipulations enabled him to build an 
empire out of nothing, Laenzo was unable to nm an airline on 
a dady basis. Instead of fixing the operational problems of the 
airlines he bought, Lmmzo let them flounder as he focused on 
making new deals. 
Lorenzo also failed because he alienated the people who 
worked for him. Lorenzo's giant debt load led him to turn to 
labor as a way of reducing overhead. His efforts to get more 
for less by intimidating employees into working harder and 
taking unprecedented wage and benefit cuts proved to be 
dkaster, pdcdarly in a highly service-oriented business like 
air travel. At Continental once known for its quality service, 
Lorenzo created an airline with embittered workers who 
disliked their jobs almost as much as passengers disliked 
flying on their planes. 
When Lorenzo applied similar tactics at Eastern, he soon 
found that he had stepped into a hornets' nest. Instead of 
trying to make peace with the carrier's employees, who had 
feuded for years with each other and with Frank Bornan, 
Eastern's previous chairman, Lorenzo struck out harder and 
harder, until fmdy Eastem's workers were willing to sacrifice 
their jobs to get rid of him. 
Frank Lorenzo exemplifies the failure of the traditional 
antagonistic methods of dealing with employees (Bernstein, 
8). He never understood that an airline's success depends on 
motivated workers providing quality service. The story of 
Lorenzo's struggle to bend Eastern employees to his will is a 
case study in why the confrontational approach is destined to 
fail (Bernstein, 8) . It is also a tale that explores the darker 
effects of the junk bond takeover era of the past decade. 
Lorenzo brought a corporate raider's ruthlessness to bear on 
the running of a company. His determination to get his way 
with employees led him to dismember the very company he 
wanted to build. Lumm fought a aholds-barred war against 
labor that ended with the destruction of both sides: tens of 
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tlmsmds of employees lost their jobs, and the United States 
lost one of its oldest major carriers. 
Contrary to popular belief, Eastern's numerous problems 
did not begin with the anival of Frank Lorenzo (Robinson, 5). 
The company's economic woes set the stage for endless civil 
wars with employees (Bernstein, 23). It was during one of 
these endless wars that Frank Borman courted Frank Lorenzo 
as a means of bludgeonmg the unions to take concessions. The 
situation got out of control quickly, with Lorenzo purchasing 
Eastern. 
Lorenzo barreled into Eastern with the attitude that the 
fastest way to turn the company around was to reduce labor 
costs. Given Eastern's ~actious intenmion relations, the old 
divide-and-conquer strategy seemed the best way to do this. 
Texas Air officials were counting on the fact that the 
machinists would react quickly and call a strike, in which 
case, Texas Air would hire non-union workers and break the 
strike (Bernstein, 55). 
The campaigo against the employees didn't come only from 
high-level management. Larenzo had put Eastern's managers 
and supervisors on a war footing. The managers used strict 
absentee policies, alleged drug abuse, and charges of phony 
medical claims and theft to fire a record 262 machinists union 
members m one year alone (Bernstein, 64). Managers became 
adept at psychological warfare. Flight attendants were forced 
to pick up trash on the planes, in violation of their contract. If 
they rehsed, they could be f d  for subordination. 
However, after two years of owning and operating Eastern, 
Frank Lorenzo had become desperate. He had mustered all his 
resources around the expectation that a showdown with labor 
would occur by April 1988 at the latest. However, the unions 
refused to be goaded into a strike (Bernstein, 71). By early 
1989, it looked as if thiugs might once go Frank Lorenzo's 
way. 
With labor negotiations going nowhere fast, the National 
Mediation Board nearly declared an impasse, in which case a 
30-day cooling off period would be started, at the end of 
which management could either enforce a contract, or labor 
could strike. On January 6, 1989, Lorenzo got his wish, the 
clock had started, ending at 12:Ol A.M. on March 4. 
Finally, Lorenzo had a dehitive date for his showdown with 
labor. Accordmg to Lorenzo's plan, when March 4' came and 
the machinists struck, the pilots union would cross the picket 
line (Robinson, 36). At that point, Lorenzo would hire new 
workers, and a newly rebuilt Eastern would have rock-bottom 
costs. 
As one last-ditch effort to keep the airline flying, Loreuzo 
offered the pilots union a new labor contract in which they 
were guaranteed jobs and pay raises. However this deal 
iachded provisions that if Eastern were declared bankntpt or 
merged into Continental, its sister airline, the contract would 
be void. Lorenzo had found just the thing to push the pilots 
over the edge (Bernstein 159). On the morning of Saturday, 
March 4, 1989, the machinists struck Eastern and both the 
flight attendants and pilots unions called sympathy strikes. 
Eastern had been v i rhdy grounded (Robinson 38). 
With no cash flowing m h m  Eastern, Lorenzo was forced 
to lay-off the remaining Eastern employees. With an entire 
airline sitting on the ground, Eastern was p l a d  into 
bankruptcy. With so much debt and the refusal of 
prof* to work for Loreazo, there was virtually no hope 
that Eastern would ever retum to the skies. In fact, it never 
did. 
CONCLUSION 
Would Eastem's fate have been any different if Lorenzo had 
taken a softer approach? It is true that Eastern had serious, 
perhaps even insurmountable, problems--but when Lorenzo 
showed up, labor was not foremost among them. The pilots 
and flight attendants had just cut Eastern's labor costs to 
reasonable levels by industry standards. For equity's sake, 
perhaps the machinists should have kicked in, too; but their 
cuts were not sufficient to make or break the company, which 
actoally managed to make a modest profit until Lorenzo 
started cutting it to pieces. 
Lorenzo was so obsessed with beating labor over the head 
that he never faced Eastern's real dilemmas: the airline's 
inherently unstable route structure and its high debt load. 
Instead of devising practical solutions, such as merging with 
a carrier that flew complementary routes, Lorenzo stripped 
Eastern and made off with net proceeds of up to $750 million 
in assets. 
Reducing labor costs could have been one way of dealing 
with the routes and debt. But doing this in an adversarial 
fashion made no sense. Eastern's fractious unions were 
dBicult to get along with, and, like most airline employees, 
they tended to blame the dficulties of deregulation on 
management. But even conservative, instinctively pro- 
business outsidgs thought Iarenzo's tougbgay approach was 
all wrong. 
Loram never played by the rules. He knew what he wanted 
JAAER, Spring 2000 
2
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 9, No. 3 [2000], Art. 3
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol9/iss3/3
Death of Eastern 
and he stuck to it, even thou# his demands were not based on 
careful financial calculations. As a result, he won the battle, 
but lost the war. 
It is possible that even the most cooperative of managers 
may not have been able to bring Eastern's divided unions 
together. Still, the company's employees had shown a 
willingness to do almost anythmg to keep their jobs and their 
company going, provided they were included in the process. 
Loreozo never saw that. Like many American managers, all 
he knew was force. To be sure, Lorenu, was an extreme 
example, but he shares with other managers the attitude that 
employees, union or nonunion, will resist unless beated into 
submission. 
Perhaps employees will submit, if given no other choice. 
But as other compaaies are coming to realize, cmfbntation is 
not the path to success. If Lorenzo had come into Eastern 
making the kinds of proposals that other potential saviors of 
Eastern did, a strong and viable airline might still be flying. 
Instead, little remains but ashes.0 
Joseph Ferrante is a junior in the lmdergrrsduate Aeronautical Science program at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. He holds 
a private pilot certificate with an instrument rating and is currently pursuing his lifelong dream of becoming a professional airline 
pilot. 
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